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Examining the feasibility of using a modelling tool to assess resilience 
across a health care system and assist with decisions concerning 
service reconfiguration 
 
Abstract 
Changes in medical practice, demographic shifts and financial pressures are all 
examples of factors that may contribute to demand for periodic changes in the 
configuration of health services. When reconfiguring a service, health planners often 
take into account projected demand for services, patient access criteria and budgetary 
constraints (amongst other things), but typically give little consideration  regarding its 
resilience to deliver services during and after external disruptions to its capability to 
deliver. In this paper we discuss a study conducted in response to a direct request 
from the National Health Service (NHS) Resilience Project within the Department of 
Health to explore the feasibility of assessing resilience across local services within the 
NHS and developing a computer software tool to assess resilience of different service 
reconfigurations. We give an account of the modelling process used, including the 
analytical framework we developed using both optimisation and heuristic methods, 
and an illustrative example of usage of a prototype software tool. We also highlight 
the key lessons that emerged during this project, which may be helpful to OR analysts 
working on similar projects regarding resilience in the public sector. 
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Introduction 
Emergency preparedness can help reduce the impact to society and the economy of 
major disruptions such as fuel shortages, an influenza pandemic or widespread 
flooding. Preparing for such events may comprise a range of measures and is often 
required to be co-ordinated across local, regional, national and sometimes 
international borders. In this paper, we focus on emergency preparedness in health 
care and, in particular, those aspects that are related to resilience. In the context of this 
work and as defined by the project’s client, we use the term resilience to mean the 
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capability of a health system to mitigate the impact of major external disruptions on 
its ability to meet the needs of the population during the disruption. Considerations of 
health system resilience may include strategic decisions, such as the allocation of 
health service provision across different sites, as well as operational decisions, such as 
the design of robust stock management for essential health care supplies. In this work 
we focus on the former.  
 
Periodic alterations in the configuration of health services arise as a result of political 
cycles, changes in medical practice, demographic shifts and financial pressures 
amongst other things. The decision-making behind reconfiguration is complicated and 
multifaceted, with health planners taking into account factors such as budgetary 
constraints, projected demand for services, the accessibility of services to patients, 
economies of scale and quality of service provision (Imison, 2010; Fulop et al., 2010). 
The configuration of a health system can affect its resilience. For example, 
reconfiguration often involves the concentration of services to enhance safety, 
effectiveness and efficiency, but this might result in a system with key services 
available at fewer sites which may be more liable to disruption. Yet it is not common 
for resilience to be taken into account explicitly in decisions concerning service 
reconfiguration within the English National Health Service (NHS). The desire to 
routinely and systematically include considerations of resilience within planning 
motivated the NHS Resilience Project within the UK Department of Health to 
instigate the research presented here.  
 
In this paper, we give an account of an Operational Research (OR) project conducted 
in response to a specific request from the Department of Health to explore the 
feasibility of assessing resilience across local health services and developing a 
computer software tool to assist with decisions concerning service reconfiguration in 
the NHS in England. The aim of the work was to investigate the potential role of OR 
in assessing resilience at a local-regional level in England and to explore the 
feasibility of developing a computer software tool to assist with decisions concerning 
service reconfiguration. We note that this request was made within the context of a 
broader UK-wide program on resilience (Cabinet Office, 2013) and other initiatives 
relating to the NHS being conducted by the Department of Health (e.g. Department of 
Health, 2008). 
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In the next section we describe in more detail the background of this work and give a 
brief summary of some relevant literature in the field. We then give a detailed account 
of the project, including an outline of an analytical framework devised, a model and 
prototype software tool developed to facilitate engagement with the envisaged end 
users, and a brief example of illustrating the use of the tool. Finally, we summarise the 
project outcomes and discuss the insights generated by the project including the 
challenges faced and the key lessons learned.  
 
Background 
In recent years there has been a number of relevant editorial, review and position 
papers on the role of OR in emergency preparedness and emergency response 
management (Altay and Green, 2006; Brandeau et al., 2009; Green and Kolesar, 
2004; Larson, 2004; Larson, 2006; Simpson and Hancock, 2009; Wein et al., 2009; 
Wright et al., 2006). The problems tackled cover a wide variety of application areas. 
Up until the 1990s, the majority of work in the field focused mainly on ‘routine 
emergencies’ within the context of established emergency services such as fire, police 
and ambulance (Simpson and Hancock, 2009). Research was largely concerned with 
determining the optimal number, location and allocation of response units within 
municipal services, as exemplified by the large body of influential work emanating 
from the New York City - RAND Institute (Green and Kolesar, 2004; Larson, 2002).  
 
More recently, there has been a shift in focus away from routine emergencies towards 
larger scale ‘disaster emergencies’, which occur “when resources become stressed, 
when non-standard procedures must be implemented to save life or when special 
authorities must be invoked to manage the event” (Altay and Green, 2006). Much of 
this work focuses on applications in security (Larson, 2004; Wein et al., 2009; Wright 
et al., 2006), the health care component of which is mainly concerned with the 
response to bioterrorist threats such as deliberate introduction of anthrax or smallpox 
(Hupert et al., 2002; Lee et al., 2009; Wein et al., 2003; Zaric et al., 2008). Other 
published examples of OR applied specifically to health care within a disaster 
emergency context, of which there are relatively few, include planning for emergency 
mass dispensing and vaccination clinics – in a pandemic influenza or otherwise (Aaby 
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et al., 2006), the routing of ambulances to hospitals in a disaster (Jotshi et al., 2009) 
and the design of interventions in a pandemic influenza (Eichner et al., 2007). 
 
An extensive selection of OR techniques has been used by researchers in the area of 
emergency preparedness. The most common appear to be mathematical programming 
including heuristics (e.g. Rolland et al., 2010), probability and statistics, and 
simulation (Green and Kolesar, 2004; Simpson and Hancock, 2009). More 
specifically in health care, discrete event simulation has been applied to the problem 
of designing antibiotic and vaccination distribution centres in the case of bioterrorist 
attacks or pandemic influenza (Aaby et al., 2006; Hupert et al., 2002; Lee et al., 
2009), whilst compartmental modelling and queuing theory have been used to 
compare various emergency responses in the event of an anthrax attack (Wein et al., 
2003; Zaric et al., 2008). Tufekci and Wallace (1998) point out a lack of information 
and decision support systems in the field, whilst Simpson and Hancock (2009) note 
that OR studies within disaster emergency preparedness have had relatively little 
influence on policy or practice, highlighting the need for positive engagement with 
responders and policy makers in future research. 
 
To the best of our knowledge, there are no OR studies reported in the literature that 
address the problem of health system resilience. Whilst we have not conducted a 
systematic review of the area, a search of the PUBMED, Web of Science and 
INFORMS databases using the keywords “resilience” and “health system” or “health 
service” did not return any relevant articles (although we acknowledge that these 
search criterion may have excluded other related keywords used by authors). A 
similar outcome was obtained by back-referencing the recently published review 
articles in OR and emergency preparedness or disaster planning (Brandeau et al., 
2009; Green and Kolesar, 2004; Simpson and Hancock, 2009). The relatively small 
body of OR work applied to health care in disaster emergencies is generally focused 
on a specific type of disaster and/or a narrow range of emergency responses affecting 
a small part of the health care system. The work reported in this paper is more 
generic, motivated by our aim of scoping a tool for use in aiding decisions concerning 
service reconfiguration at a strategic level.  
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Modelling process 
MODELLING APPROACH  
Given the remit of the project (to explore the feasibility of developing a computer 
software tool to assess resilience of different service reconfigurations), and the wide 
scope and complexity of the problem, we decided to formulate a deterministic model 
in the first instance. This approach was based on the notion that if one cannot build 
and populate a simple model of service delivery, as required for the purposes of this 
problem, then doing so for a more complex, stochastic model would be unrealistic.  
 
The intended use of the proposed model is to give an assessment of the impact of a 
given pattern of disruption to health care resources and infrastructure, including 
supply chains, on the capability of the health system to respond to the attendant 
pattern of demand (in terms of number of cases) for certain care services. In doing 
this, it seems sensible to consider feasible responses to disruption in terms of 
reallocation of resources. In this work we have chosen to incorporate a range of such 
responses within the model (using optimisation and heuristic methods to capture 
response) to take into account inherent uncertainty surrounding the nature of this 
response. 
 
The schematic diagram in Figure 1 gives an overview of how the proposed modelling 
tool fits into a broader analytical framework. The specific cause of the disruption 
under consideration (e.g. pandemic influenza, inland flooding or severe weather) does 
not explicitly inform the assessment of impact other than by informing, in some 
process outwith the scope of the model, both the pattern of disruption to health care 
infrastructure and the pattern of demand for acute care services. We envisage that 
users would generate disruption scenarios in line with regional and national initiatives 
for disruption planning such as the Community Risk Registers (see, for example, 
Warwickshire County Council, 2011) and the National Risk Register for Civil 
Emergencies in the UK (Cabinet Office, 2008). The pattern of disruption associated 
with a scenario is taken as an input to the model and is defined by reductions in 
resources (in the broadest sense) at specific hospitals. In a similar fashion, the pattern 
of demand associated with a scenario is taken as an input to the model and is defined 
by demand for health care services at each hospital.  
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Figure 1: A schematic diagram showing the scope of the model (inside the dashed 
line) within a broader analytical framework. 
MODELLING TOOL 
Conceptually, the model represents a stylised health system comprising three basic 
entities: care services (each a combination of a defined set of health care interventions 
for a specified group of patients), hospitals and resources (such as staff, clinical 
environments, utilities, and clinical and non-clinical supplies). Figure 2 illustrates the 
relationships between these three entities. The ‘requirement’ relationship gives the 
numerical amounts of each resource required to deliver care services, whilst the 
‘availability’ relationship gives the amount of each resource available at each hospital 
(intrinsically or via a supply chain). The demand for care services (‘demand’) is 
quantified in terms of the number of cases.  
 
 
Figure 2: The three conceptual entities (hospital, service and resource) and their 
relationships as used in the model. Resources are assumed to be intrinsic to a hospital 
or available via a supply chain (organisat7ions and/or companies that are not under 
the direct control of the NHS).  
Service 
Hospital 
Resource 
requirement 
availability demand 
Pattern 
 of disruption 
Scenario 
Assessment 
of impact 
Pattern 
 of demand 
Feasible 
response 
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Summary of modelling assumptions  
The health care system is modelled in simple terms akin to an industrial process, 
whereby a range of different activities (health care services) take place, each requiring 
resources of different types. We assume that hospitals may provide a number of care 
services and that each individual case is managed entirely at a single hospital. 
Furthermore, we assume that there is no variability in the resources required to deliver 
a single case of a given service, either between individuals or across hospitals. 
Disruption to the availability of resources is assumed to be fixed over a single period 
of interest. We also assume that demand for services is deterministic and that, 
immediately prior to the period of interest, demand for health services is met. Finally, 
we assume that resources within each hospital can be re-allocated and that, subject to 
resource constraints, the level of each type of care service provided can be adjusted. 
Resilience planning based on unmet demand  
The focus of our analysis is the unmet demand that may occur as a result of disruption 
to resources or a changed pattern of demand, alone or in combination.  In order to 
estimate unmet demand however, a view has to be taken as to what might constitute a 
plausible response to disruption on the part of the local health system. Given that we 
do not know what the precise nature of such a response will be, we formulated a range 
of possible responses of varying degree of sophistication (using optimisation and 
heuristic methods) based on discussions with stakeholders and for the specific 
purposes of this feasibility study. We note that some unmet demand (e.g. elective 
cases that can safely be delayed) could potentially be deemed less important than 
others (e.g. emergency cases that cannot safely be delayed). For this reason, the model 
was designed to allow for an optional weighting to be associated with the perceived 
importance of each service by the user. We did not address in our research the actual 
method for allocating these weights. 
Optimisation-based response to disruption  
The optimisation-based approach, which represents the most sophisticated response to 
disruption considered, is based on an assumption that resources would be optimally 
allocated to services within and between hospitals in order to minimise unmet 
weighted demand. Technically, an integer programming problem is formulated to 
express the problem of minimising unmet weighted demand by reallocating resources 
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and determining levels of different forms of care service within each hospital. The 
optimisation is subject to constraints related to the observation that care service 
activity over the period of interest (in terms of number of cases treated) cannot exceed 
demand (and must be non-negative) and that such activity is also constrained by the 
availability of each resource. A mathematical description of the optimisation model is 
in the Appendix.  
Heuristics-based response to disruption  
In addition to the integer programming method, three different heuristic algorithms 
were formulated, each reflecting plausible rules for resource allocation in the face of 
disruption. The first algorithm represents a ‘business-as-usual’ approach until the first 
resource constraint is reached. It calculates the service activity under disruption by 
scaling down the pre-disruption activity by the minimum feasible proportion given the 
reduced resource availability. The second algorithm considers each resource in turn 
and scales down the caseload delivery by an appropriate factor to reflect the reduction 
in resource availability. Finally, the third algorithm attempts to prioritise the highest 
priority care services (ranked according to user-defined weights) as far as possible by, 
potentially, redirecting resources away from services deemed to be of lower priority. 
A technical description of all three algorithms is in the Appendix. 
Suspension of non-emergency care services 
In the description above we have assumed that service managers will attempt as far as 
possible to maintain the delivery of all types of care services during a disruption (with 
some services potentially having higher priority). An alternative response, which was 
included in the modelling tool, may be to temporarily suspend low priority care 
services in times of disruption to free up resources to deal with more urgent or higher 
priority care services. 
Prototype software tool 
A working version of a prototype software tool was developed to facilitate the 
engagement with potential end users and project stakeholders and the communication 
of the proposed model’s structure and data requirements. It was also used to test the 
computational feasibility of the envisaged mathematical framework by enabling the 
construction of illustrative examples (see below for example). In the prototype, the 
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user can enter realistic test data in terms of number of services, resources, hospitals 
and the supply chain, as well as an optional weighting associated with the perceived 
importance of each service. The relationship between services and resources and the 
availability of resources at each hospital are also user-defined. Scenarios are specified 
as changes to the quantity of resources available at each hospital and the post-
disruption demand for services associated with each hospital. The prototype was 
developed using MS Excel, making use of Solver to implement the optimisation 
problem and Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) routines to code the heuristic 
algorithms.  
ILLUSTRATIVE TOOL USAGE 
As part of the process of engaging with project stakeholders, we populated the 
prototype software using an illustrative example involving a hypothetical local health 
system under different service configurations. We used the example to showcase the 
analysis of the effects on the health system of resource reductions of a type and 
magnitude thought to be plausible by the sponsors of this study and of interest to them 
within the remit of this work. The model parameters were estimated, in part, by 
publicly available data regarding the English NHS (where possible) and with other 
estimates based on expert opinion. We stress that the example was developed for 
illustrative purposes only and is not intended to represent any real health care system. 
A fully calibrated case study would potentially consider a larger range of services and 
resources (for example, a richer and more representative range of staff inputs and 
some attempt to capture the range of equipment and drugs used in care provision) as 
well as more detailed data describing the demand. 
 
The example was designed to reflect some stylised aspects of acute care service 
provision in an area with a population of about 500,000 people. We considered three 
service configuration scenarios informed by a well-documented tendency towards 
centralisation in healthcare (Academy of Medical Royal Colleges, 2007; King's Fund, 
2007; Pollock et al., 1999). The first was the ‘status quo’ scenario under which all 
services take place at all hospitals (Figure 3a). In the remaining two scenarios 
paediatric and paediatric and maternity care services were centralised at a small 
number of the hospitals in the local health system (Figure 3b and 3c).   
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The reductions to the resources at each hospital were of a type and magnitude that 
might reasonably be associated with widespread inland flooding within the catchment 
area of the health system as outlined in national and regional emergency preparedness 
planning scenarios. We considered three levels of resource disruption associated with 
the flooding, corresponding to mild, moderate or severe disruption (Table 1).  
 
Table 1: Disruption levels and corresponding resource reduction 
Disruption 
scenario  
Disruption to 
availability of 
beds  
Disruption to 
availability of 
staff 
Disruption to 
own-source 
resources 
Disruption to 
supply-chain 
resources 
mild 0% 30% 10% 20% 
moderate 0% 50% 20% 40% 
severe 20% 70% 30% 70% 
 
The adoption of these resource disruptions was based on the following assumptions: 
 Flooding is more likely to disrupt the supply chain provision of resources than 
on-site resource provision due to disruptions in the transport infrastructure.  
 Flooding is unlikely to affect the availability of beds unless it is severe and 
directly affects hospital infrastructure. 
 Flooding is likely to cause a relatively large scale disruption to staff 
availability via its effects on the transport infrastructure. 
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Figure 3: Schematic representation of the example scenarios of service 
reconfiguration and disruption considered. 
 
We assumed that flooding causes resource disruption at three of the medium-sized 
hospitals, two of which coincide with hospitals at which maternity and paediatric 
services are centralised (the third hospital at which maternity services are centralised 
was assumed not to have been affected), Figure 3d. 
 
The resilience of acute care service provision under differing levels of service 
centralisation was analysed in terms of unmet demand for a range of disruptions (of 
differing severity) that affect resource availability but maintain fixed levels of 
demand. The model inputs and the particulars of the disruption and centralisation 
scenarios are outlined briefly in Table 1 and Table 2; further details of the numerical 
inputs used, along with the assumptions used to arrive at these inputs, are contained in 
the Supplement. 
 
Table 2: Model inputs and description of the disruption and centralisation scenarios of 
the illustrative example (further details of the numerical inputs used, along with the 
assumptions used to arrive at these inputs, are contained in the Supplement) 
Model inputs Description 
Care services  Eight care services are offered within hospitals of the local health 
system, namely: Paediatric, Maternity, Surgery and Acute 
a) Existing configuration of services b) Centralisation of paediatric services 
c) Centralisation of paediatric and maternity services d) Levels of flooding leading to disruption 
paediatric 
services 
maternity 
services 
surgery 
acute 
medicine 
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Medicine, each subdivided into emergency and non-emergency 
care services. 
Hospitals Ten hospitals of varying size are included in the example. It is 
assumed that of these hospitals, two are large, five are medium-
sized and three are small, in terms of demand for various services 
(see Supplement). The total demand for services was considered to 
remain unchanged under disruption. 
Resource 
availability 
The resources available to each hospital prior to disruption were 
calculated based on the demand for services, the resource 
requirement to deliver each service and the assumption of zero 
unmet demand prior to disruption. The Supplement contains 
further details on the calculations involved. 
Configuration 
options 
In addition to the ‘status-quo’ option already discussed, we 
considered two possible reconfiguration options (see Figure 3): 
Option 1 - Centralisation of paediatric services. Paediatric services 
are concentrated at two medium-sized hospitals, with total demand 
for these services unchanged from the status quo but distributed 
equally between the two specialist paediatric hospitals. 
Option 2 - Centralisation of paediatric and maternity services. 
Paediatric services are concentrated as in option 1; maternity 
services are concentrated at three medium-sized hospitals, with 
total demand for these services unchanged from the status quo but 
distributed equally between the three specialist maternity hospitals. 
Scenarios 
 
The reductions to the resources at each hospital were of a type and 
magnitude that might reasonably be associated with widespread 
inland flooding within the catchment area of the health system as 
outlined in national and regional emergency preparedness planning 
scenarios and agreed by project stakeholders (Figure 3). We 
considered three levels of resource disruption associated with the 
flooding, corresponding to mild, moderate or severe disruption. 
The details of the numerical effects on resource availability are 
summarised in Table 1 and the Supplement. 
 
Results of illustrative example 
The model was run for each of the three service configurations and each of the 
disruption levels (mild, moderate and severe). The outputs are summarised in Tables 
3-4, where unmet demand is reported for the optimisation and three heuristic 
modelling approaches described previously. Table 3 summarises results where it is 
assumed that both emergency and non-emergency services are retained whilst Table 4 
summarises results under the suspension of non-emergency services (see relevant 
subsection above). 
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The results indicate that in resilience terms, centralisation may reduce the ability of 
the health service to meet demand for health care. Unsurprisingly, this is especially 
true if disruptions occur at hospitals where specialties serving a wide catchment area 
are located. As expected, more severe disruptions are associated with higher unmet 
demand across the range of system responses. The scale of unmet demand varies 
across the range of models, with its smallest value for the optimisation and largest 
outputs corresponding to the single-step scaling algorithm.  
 
Table 3: The impact of flooding on services, expressed as percentage of unmet 
demand for all services (retaining both emergency and non-emergency services). 
 
Table 4: The impact of flooding on services, expressed as percentage of unmet 
demand for all emergency services, with non-emergency services suspended. 
  Optimi-
sation 
response 
Heuristics response 
Disruption 
severity 
Configuration 
Resource-
based 
Service-
based 
Single 
step 
Mild 
No centralisation 5% 8% 8% 8% 
Paediatrics centralised 7% 10% 9% 10% 
Maternity and paediatrics 
centralised 8% 12% 10% 12% 
Moderate 
No centralisation 10% 13% 13% 14% 
Paediatrics centralised 12% 17% 15% 17% 
Maternity and paediatrics 
centralised 14% 20% 18% 20% 
Severe 
No centralisation 15% 19% 18% 19% 
Paediatrics centralised 19% 24% 23% 24% 
Maternity and paediatrics 
centralised 23% 28% 26% 28% 
  Optimi-
sation 
response 
Heuristics response 
Disruption 
severity 
Configuration 
Resource-
based 
Service-
based 
Single 
step 
Mild 
No centralisation 0.4% 4% 0.4% 8% 
Paediatrics centralised 0.4% 5% 0.4% 10% 
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Engagement with stakeholders 
The stakeholders in this project can be separated into two groups, namely the “client” 
who defined the project remit and commissioned the work, and the “envisaged end 
users” of any potential software tool. The former was the UK Department of Health 
and the latter are, broadly speaking, national and regional emergency planners. At the 
time of conducting the project, the client defined the primary envisaged end users to 
be the emergency planning leads of the 10 UK Strategic Health Authorities (SHA EP 
leads). 
 
Throughout the project we held regular discussions with the client regarding the remit 
of the work, development of a suitable modelling approach, engagement with end 
users, illustrative prototype usage and the lessons learned from the feasibility study. 
We used the model and accompanying prototype software tool and illustrative 
example to raise awareness of the complex issues involved and to provide a focus for 
these discussions. We also used them to engage with the SHA EP leads in considering 
data requirements and their availability within the health service, and in seeking 
opinion on issues around suitability and usability of tool. 
 
The early stages of the modelling approach were informed by interviews with two 
SHA EP leads. Subsequently, a meeting was held with all of the SHA EP leads in 
which we addressed the following questions: Would the envisaged output of the tool 
be useful to you? What level of detail would such output need to have to be useful? 
Maternity and paediatrics 
centralised 0.9% 7% 0.9% 12% 
Moderate 
No centralisation 5% 8% 5% 14% 
Paediatrics centralised 5% 9% 5% 16% 
Maternity and paediatrics 
centralised 8% 13% 8% 20% 
Severe 
No centralisation 14% 14% 14% 19% 
Paediatrics centralised 15% 18% 15% 22% 
Maternity and paediatrics 
centralised 20% 24% 20% 28% 
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Would it help you contribute to the decision-making process? What level of 
confidence in the tool would you need to have? Supplementary questionnaires 
regarding the availability of parameters that would need to be estimated based on 
local knowledge were completed by SHA EP leads as well as a consultant in General 
and Geriatric Medicine, a consultant in Cardio-Thoracic Surgery and a senior 
operations manager of a large teaching hospital. The outcomes of these consultations 
and the lessons learnt informed the final decision taken by the client. 
 
Discussion 
This paper gives an account of an Operational Research (OR) project conducted in 
response to a specific request from the National Health Service (NHS) Resilience 
Project within the Department of Health to explore the feasibility of assessing 
resilience across local health services and developing a computer software tool to 
assist with decisions concerning service reconfiguration in the NHS in England.  
 
We developed a generic analytical framework for modelling the impact on care 
service activity of potential disruptions to a health system and, as a means of 
communicating with stakeholders and to test the feasibility of the suggested model 
and subsequent software tool, we constructed a prototype tool and an illustrative 
example that involves a hypothetical local health system under different service 
configurations. We deliberately adopted a modelling approach that led to simple and 
static model of service delivery, as opposed to a more complex, stochastic model that 
would have allowed the capturing of notions of service variability, on the assumption 
that if it is infeasible to build and populate the former, then it would also be infeasible 
to build the latter. System dynamics, in particular, was considered and rejected on the 
basis of the need for a simple, static approach and the perceived lack of added value 
to the modelling in this particular study by including feedback loops.  
 
We note that our approach does not address the capability of the system to return to 
routine activity, which may involve dealing with a backlog of routine activity 
resulting from resources being diverted to deal with the disruption (e.g. increased 
waiting lists for elective care). Nor does our approach allow for disruptions to health 
systems with existing waiting lists (we use a simplifying assumption that, 
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immediately prior to a disruption, demand for services is met), and we note that the 
long terms effects on such services could be substantial even if the immediate 
emergency response is adequate. 
 
Both the mathematical model and accompanying prototype software tool differ 
substantially from other published modelling work in the field of emergency 
preparedness, not least because we addressed issues of strategic decisions in health 
system planning as opposed to operational issues arising from disruptions (Green and 
Kolesar, 2004; Simpson and Hancock, 2009). Whilst the benefits of computer 
simulation methods have been exploited in a number of context-specific applications 
within the field (Aaby et al., 2006; Hupert et al., 2002), our choice of modelling 
methodology arising from the envisaged use of the tool, has the benefit of lending 
itself more readily to iterative use as a planning tool and ultimately free distribution to 
end users. 
 
A number of learning points have emerged during this project, both from the research 
and development conducted in relation to the modelling tool and from our 
engagement with potential end users and other health professionals. From a health 
system’s perspective, there seems to be very limited detailed knowledge on the 
number and quantity of services and supplies that are outsourced or provided through 
external supply chains (organisations and/or companies that are not under the direct 
control of the NHS). In addition to having an impact on the calibration of the tool, it 
raises the related question of the actual resilience of the NHS supply chain.  
 
The envisaged end users of the modelling tool voiced concerns regarding the scope 
and utility of introducing new software tools given their workload levels and the 
number of tools and new initiatives for other purposes demanding their attention. Any 
decisions regarding eventual tool implementation and deployment would have to 
include extensive further engagement with those end users and provisions for 
soliciting and incorporating their feedback. 
 
A key requirement for appropriate use of any modelling tool is knowledge or data 
concerning the resources (such as staff time, clinical environments and equipment, 
supplies and utilities) used in delivering different services. Readily available patient 
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activity and administrative national data sources could be used to derive estimates of 
historical demand for services and the quantity of resources required to deliver these 
services to a patient population. Indeed, a calibration strategy was devised as part of 
this project using data from the Hospital Episode Statistics for patient activity and the 
NHS Information Centre for Health and Social Care workforce database for staffing. 
Inevitably, a number of parameters that need to be estimated are not available directly 
from data sources. Although, any existing data could potentially be augmented with 
the tacit knowledge of clinical experts and health managers, with recourse to 
guidelines and other clinical texts where appropriate, it is important to note that 
questions remain as to whether such a tool could be calibrated at a sufficiently 
detailed level for it to be useful. Maintaining and updating the calibration data would 
pose additional and substantial burdens, especially considering the dynamic and 
rapidly changing nature of the NHS.  
 
A number of questions arise in the discourse about the role and scope of OR in 
projects with a strategic focus, as opposed to an operational one, and where the 
constituent elements of the problem are intrinsically unstructured. For example, can a 
simplified model ever capture enough of the essential details of the problem to 
meaningfully address it? On the other hand, is it practical or even possible to build a 
model that includes all necessary details and relaxes most of the restrictive modelling 
assumptions?  Which exactly are the trade-offs between how comprehensive the 
model is, the level of detail within the model and the feasibility of model calibration? 
 
In this paper, we have given a detailed account of an OR project that investigated the 
feasibility of developing a modelling tool that can be used to provide estimates of 
unmet demand for services under conditions of disruption while allowing for different 
levels of system response. The intended usage of such tool would be to provide 
emergency planning personnel with a systematic means of informing improvements to 
NHS resilience and in assessing the potential impact on resilience of any proposed 
reconfiguration of services. Despite this important role, we identified a number of 
significant barriers to successful implementation and deployment including those 
arising from computational, calibration, maintenance, user acceptability and 
practicality issues.  
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A sensible way forward for a national or regional health care service interested in 
resilience planning would include an investment into creating and maintaining a data 
repository that will include detailed and current information on health care facilities 
(hospitals etc.), the local availability of resources (staff, supplies etc.) and the 
availability of resources and services that are outsourced to external organisations. 
Such a data repository, in addition to assisting in the operational decision during an 
emergency, should provide the foundation and data needed to then develop a 
modelling tool to assist in resilience planning. 
 
Our work demonstrates the intrinsic difficulty, and yet potential value, of using OR to 
support policy-makers in addressing complex strategic questions for which there is no 
obvious, well-structured method or approach. Informing such debates demands a 
more nuanced approach than that of modelling to support a well-defined operational 
decision. There is a lack of explicit, clear thinking about resilience and the strategic 
consequences of service reconfiguration at present: the work discussed in this paper 
was used to good effect in identifying and presenting different elements of this 
problem both to policy colleagues and regional planners and exploring the potential 
viability of developing and putting to use a software tool. In this regard, our work 
made a beneficial contribution to the decision making process, which, ultimately 
concluded that such a tool was infeasible at present without significant additional 
investment. 
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Appendix 
 
In this section we introduce the notation used to characterise the demand for and 
delivery of health care services within a local health system and its capability to adapt 
service activity in the face of disruption or changed patterns of demand. We begin by 
describing the main elements associated with service activity. This is followed by 
descriptions of the supply and demand relationships which link these elements and the 
various levels of service activity. We then set out the integer programming problem 
that represents the most sophisticated response to disruption considered and discuss 
the computational feasibility of solving such problems. Finally, we describe the three 
heuristic algorithms each reflecting less sophisticated but perhaps more plausible rules 
for resource allocation in the face of disruption. 
MODEL NOTATION 
The following definitions summarise the elements used in the mathematical model, 
where possible following mnemonic conventions: 
 
Let H denote the number of hospitals within the health system, indexed h.  
 
Let C be the number of distinct care services, indexed c.  
 
Let R be the number of distinct types of resources that are considered, indexed r.  
 
For Cc 1 , Hh 1 , let hcd ,  denote the demand (in terms of the number of cases 
presenting for treatment) over the period of interest for the c-th care service at the h-th 
hospital and hcd ,  denote the demand over the equivalent period prior to disruption.  
 
For Cc 1 , Hh 1 , let hcv ,  denote the number of cases requiring the c-th care 
service that are treated at the h-th hospital over the period of interest and hcv ,  denote 
the number treated over the equivalent period prior to disruption. 
 
For Hh 1 , Rr 1 , let 1,,rhq  and 1,,rhq  be the quantities of resource r that are 
available from on-site resource reserves at the h-th hospital over the period of interest 
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and over an equivalent period prior to disruption respectively. Similarly, let 2,,rhq  and 
2,,rhq  be the quantities available via the supply chain. 
 
For Hh 1 , Rr 1 , let hrT ,  and hrT ,  denote the total amount of resource 
r available at the h-th hospital during the period of interest and during an equivalent 
period prior to disruption respectively.  
 
For Cc 1 , Rr 1 , let rcx ,  denote the quantity of resource r  required, per case, 
for the delivery of care service c.  
 
For Cc 1  , Hh 1 , let hcw ,  denote a user-defined weight reflecting the 
perceived importance of providing the c-th care service at the h-th hospital.  
RESILIENCE PLANNING BASED ON UNMET DEMAND 
The focus of our analysis is the unmet demand that occurs as a result of a disruption 
and the extent to which this can be mitigated by the choice of the number of services 
to provide in each hospital. In the model we express the unmet demand under 
disruption for care service c at the h-th hospital as hchc vd ,,  . The corresponding 
weighted unmet demand is  hchchc vdw ,,,  . 
 
This unmet demand can be summed over all services and hospitals to give the 
aggregated weighted unmet demand as follows: 
 
     
 

H
h
C
c
hchchc vdwU
1 1
,,, .                  (1) 
 
It is important to note that, due to our assumption that demand is met prior to the 
period of disruption, any unmet demand can be attributed to the disruption.  
 
As stated previously, in order to assess impact, a view has to be taken as to what 
might constitute a plausible response to disruption on the part of the local health 
system. We formulated a number of possible responses, chosen as they characterise 
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responses that have varying degrees of sophistication. The first formulation is based 
on an assumption that resources would be allocated to services within each hospital in 
order to minimise unmet demand. There follow three different heuristic algorithms 
characterising plausible rules for resource allocation in the face of disruption.   
OPTIMISATION-BASED RESPONSE TO DISRUPTION 
We begin this section by discussing a number of constraints that are necessary given 
the nature of the model.  
 
We note that, in terms of the notation defined above, the following relationships 
follow from the definitions of the total amounts of different resource types available 
at each hospital over the period of interest: 
 
 2,,1,,, hrhrhr qqT      Hh 1 , Rr 1 .                  (2) 
 
Given that the number of cases treated over the period of interest cannot exceed the 
number of cases presenting for treatment and that both are non-negative, there are the 
following constraints: 
 
 hchc dv ,,0       Cc 1  , Hh 1 .                  (3) 
 
Care activity is also constrained in terms of resource availability, summarised by the 
following: 
 
 hr
C
c
hcrc Tvx ,
1
,,


    Hh 1 , Rr 1 ,                   (4) 
 
which, in view of (2), can be re-written as 
 
 2,,1,,
1
,, hrhr
C
c
hcrc qqvx 

,               Hh 1 , Rr 1 .                 (5) 
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An integer programming formulation has been used to express the problem of 
minimising unmet weighted demand by reallocating resources and determining levels 
of different forms of care service within each hospital, by minimising the function U, 
given in (1), subject to (3) and (5) and the requirement that the decision variables 
 hcv ,  are non-negative integers. 
 
We note that although such modelling implicitly allows for reallocation of resources 
within a single hospital, there are no explicit decision variables related to such 
reallocation, although the numerical values associated with the optimal allocation can 
be inferred from the solution to the integer programming problem. We also note that it 
is theoretically straightforward to extend this approach to include the case where 
resources or demand can be reallocated between hospitals, although at the expense of 
a considerably heavier computational burden (as seen in the results of an investigation 
in the next sub-section). In reality such a response would be challenging given that it 
would require coordinated decision making across hospitals and thus, have opted for 
the more simple case of within-hospital reallocation of resources and demand. 
RESULTS OF COMPUTATIONAL FEASIBILITY TESTS 
Key to assessing the impact of disruption is to gauge what might constitute a plausible 
response to disruption on the part of the NHS. The mathematical framework for the 
impact assessment tool thus introduced various approaches for assessing impact given 
different levels of response. There are limits to the ability of a software tool to solve 
the proposed optimisation problems associated with minimising unmet demand. These 
limits depend on the number of resources, assets, supply chain assets and services that 
are included in the model, as well as hardware and software limitations.  
 
To assess the computational practicalities of the proposed approaches, we compared 
the number of constraints and decision variables for various optimisation problems 
associated with the measurement of disruption and feasible response under illustrative 
but realistic assumptions about the numbers of hospitals, supply chain assets, services 
and resources (Table A1). The first row of the table refers to optimisation within 
individual hospitals, with no reallocation of resources or demand between them; the 
resulting problem is one that could be solved using widely available software. The 
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next three rows refer to optimisation problems concerning the reallocation of 
resources, demand or both across a cluster of five local hospitals; the resulting 
problems could potentially be solved but perhaps only by using specialist software. 
The final three rows refer to the reallocation of resources, demand or both across an 
entire region; the resulting problems would test or exceed the capabilities of specialist 
software.   
 
Table A1: Size of the optimisation-based disruption measure problems. 
 
No of 
hospitals 
No of 
supply 
chain 
assets 
No of 
services 
No of 
resources 
No of 
decision 
variables 
No of 
constraints 
Within-hospital 
optimisation   
1 N/A 15 60 15 105 
Resource 
reallocation  
5 10 15 60 5027 3375 
Demand 
reallocation  
5 10 15 60 601 150 
Resource and 
demand 
reallocation 
5 10 15 60 5103 3450 
Resource 
reallocation  
50 10 15 60 39452 33750 
Demand 
reallocation  
50 10 15 60 6001 1500 
Resource and 
demand 
reallocation  
50 10 15 60 40203 34500 
 
HEURISTIC RESPONSES TO DISRUPTION 
We describe below three simple heuristics devised to characterise differing levels of 
potential response. Once more, we assume fixed resource and demand allocation at 
each hospital. 
Algorithm 1 – Single step scaling of service activity  
This algorithm represents a ‘business-as-usual’ approach until the first resource 
constraint is reached. It calculates the care activity under disruption by scaling down 
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the pre-disruption activity by the minimum proportion that is feasible (given the 
disrupted resource availability). Expressed mathematically, the measure of disruption 
is obtained by defining 
hr
hr
rh
T
T
,
,
min

  and then setting ),min( ,,, hchchhc dvv    for 
Cc 1 . This algorithm is relatively simple and easy to implement, although no 
reallocation of resources between services is incorporated within this response and so 
it is likely to over-estimate impact. We have opted to include it in the analysis and the 
prototype modelling tool as it provides a computationally efficient method of 
obtaining an initial lower bound to the problem. 
Algorithm 2 – Iterative scaling of service activity (resource based) 
The main idea behind this algorithm is to consider each resource in turn and scale 
down the caseload delivery by an appropriate factor to reflect the reduction in 
resource availability. In what follows, let K  be the set of all resources and L  be the 
set of care services. For each care service c, define rL  as the subset of L  consisting of 
all c such that 0, rcx  (i.e. the set of all care services that depend on resource r ). 
 
The algorithm is carried out on a hospital-by-hospital basis, so the full algorithm 
consists of carrying out the steps set out below for each hospital (beginning, for each 
hospital, with K  and L  as the full set of resources and services respectively). 
Step 1: From the set K , pick minr  such that 
hr
hr
T
T
,
,

 is minimised. Calculate the 
scaled care activity for all 
minr
Lc  at h, conditional on the reduced resource 
availability, by setting 
















 
 hchc
hr
hr
hc dv
T
T
v ,,
,
,
, ,min
min
min  for .1 Cc    
Step 2: Update resource availability assuming the delivery described in Step 1 
takes place. Thus, for each resource r , replace hrT ,  by 


min
,,,
rLc
rchchr xvT . 
Step 3:  Remove the resource minr  from the set K  and remove all care services c 
such that 0
min,
rcx  from L . If either K  or L  is empty, the algorithm terminates. 
Otherwise, return to Step 1. 
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Algorithm 3 – Iterative scaling of service activity (service-based) 
The motivation for this algorithm is an attempt to prioritise care services according to 
the user-defined weights hcw , ) as far as possible by, potentially, redirecting resources 
away from services deemed to be of lower priority. The algorithm is carried out on a 
hospital-by-hospital basis, so the full algorithm consists of carrying out the steps set 
out below at each hospital (i.e. for each value of h). 
Step1: From the set of weights  Ccw hc 1,  associated with h, choose the 
largest member and calculate the maximum feasible activity of the associated 
service c at h, which is given by 




 

rc
hr
Kr x
T
c
,
,
min  (where  0: ,  rcc xrK  i.e. the set 
of resources r  required to deliver care service c ). The expression for the service 
delivery is then given by 













 


hc
rc
hr
Kr
hc d
x
T
v
c
,
,
,
, ,minmin , which precludes the 
possibility of service over-provision. The notation  z  refers to the integer part 
of z . 
Step 2: Update all resource availability assuming the delivery described in Step 1 
takes place. Under this scenario, the resource availability is reduced for all 
resources required in the delivery of c. This means that we replace hrT ,  by 
hchchr xvT ,,,   for each resource cKr . 
Step 3: Remove hcw ,  from the set of weights associated with hospital h. If the set 
of weights is empty then terminate the algorithm. Otherwise, return to Step 1. 
 
This algorithm implicitly assumes that all weights are distinct. In the case of equal 
weights, the steps are carried out for all different permutations of the services carrying 
equal weights and the permutation which corresponds to the minimal unmet demand 
is chosen. 
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SUPPLEMENT 
In this supplement, we summarise the numerical inputs for the illustrative example 
described in the main paper and the assumptions and data sources used to calculate 
these inputs. The main data sources used for parameter estimation, where possible, 
were the NHS Information Centre for Health and Social Care workforce database 
(http://www.ic.nhs.uk/), used to gauge the size of the health service workforce, and 
the Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) database (http://www.hesonline.nhs.uk/), used 
to estimate the volume of cases by medical specialty. We also used the published 
findings of previous studies as well as expert opinion. We use a ‘finished consultant 
episode (FCE)’, which is defined by HES as a period of care under the responsibility 
of a consultant of a given medical specialty, as a proxy for a case of a given care 
service. 
CARE SERVICE DEFINITIONS 
The service groupings used in the example correspond, as far as possible, to the 
definitions used by the NHS Information Centre for Health and Social Care workforce 
database, with, in some cases, adjustments to the definitions based on differences in 
categorisation between the HES data and the workforce database. The breakdowns are 
as follows: 
 
 Paediatric services consist of Paediatrics and Paediatric cardiology 
 Maternity services consist of Obstetrics and Gynaecology 
 Surgery consists of Cardiothoracic surgery, General surgery, Neurosurgery, 
Paediatric surgery, Plastic surgery, Trauma and orthopaedic surgery, Urology, 
Ophthalmology and Otolaryngology (the last two placed in the surgical group 
according to the Workforce Database). 
 Acute medicine, for our purposes, comprises the following specialties: Ear, 
Nose and Throat, Accident and Emergency, General Medicine, 
Gastroentorology, Critical Care Medicine, Clinical Haematology, Clinical 
Genetics, Palliative Medicine, Respiratory (Thoracic) Medicine, Infectious 
Diseases, Nephrology, Medical Oncology, Neurology, Rheumatology and 
Geriatric Medicine. This categorisation is based on the General Medicine 
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group definition from the NHS Information Centre for Health and Social Care 
workforce database and information from the HES database. 
RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS OF SERVICES 
The numerical values for the resource requirement (per case of a given service) 
reported here are, in some sense, averages of the constituent specialties of each of the 
four aggregated service groups we consider. The medical staff figures for the resource 
requirements are based on the ratio between medical staff full time equivalents (FTEs) 
in a given specialty (obtained from the NHS Information Centre for Health and Social 
Care workforce database) and the number of FCEs for that specialty (obtained from 
the HES database), Table S1. These ratios are summarised in Table S2 and are taken 
to reflect the ‘medical staff intensity’ of each specialty group. 
 
 
Table S1: Resource requirements (units of resource required to deliver a case of 
service) 
  Resource requirements 
Services Resources Emergency 
Non-
emergency* 
Acute medical 
 
Bed-days 4.2¶ 2.1 
Nursing staff-days 6.5† 3.3 
Paediatrician-days - - 
Physician-days 1.6 0.8 
Surgeon-days - - 
Obstetrician-days - - 
Units of red blood cells 0.1‡ 0.06 
Clean instruments (relative measure) 1 0.5 
Maternity Bed-days 1.2 0.7 
Nursing staff-days 3.6 1.8 
Paediatrician-days - - 
Physician-days - - 
Surgeon-days - - 
Obstetrician-days 0.8 0.4 
Units of red blood cells 0.05 0.03 
Clean instruments (relative measure) 1 0.5 
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Paediatric Bed-days 2.8 1.4 
Nursing staff-days 4.2 2.1 
Paediatrician-days 1.9 0.9 
Physician-days - - 
Surgeon-days - - 
Obstetrician-days - - 
Units of red blood cells 0.1 0.06 
Clean instruments (relative measure) 1 0.5 
Surgery Bed-days 4.1 2.1 
Nursing staff-days 4.5 2.2 
Paediatrician-days - - 
Physician-days - - 
Surgeon-days 1.8 0.9 
Obstetrician-days - - 
Units of red blood cells 0.2 0.1 
Clean instruments (relative measure) 2 1 
* All non-emergency care estimates were calculated based on the assumption that the resource usage 
for non-emergency care is half that for emergency care. 
¶ Estimates of bed-days and clean instruments were based on expert opinion. 
† All staff-related estimates were based on a combination of data obtained from the NHS Information 
Centre for Health and Social Care workforce database and HES with assumptions based on expert 
opinion. 
‡ Estimates of blood usage were based on a combination of data obtained from HES, NHS Blood and 
Transplant and a published paper (Wells et al., 2002),  with assumptions based on expert opinion. 
 
Table S2: Staff intensity per specialty group 
Specialty 
Relative number of medical staff 
in each specialty (adjusted so 
that it is equal to 1 for surgery) 
Maternity 0.5 
Paediatric 1.0 
Surgery 1.0 
Acute 
Medical 0.9 
 
 31 
Nurse FTEs are defined relative to medical staff FTEs, assuming that each case (FCE) 
requires a contribution from both Medical staff and Nursing & Midwife staff, Table 
S3. 
 
  Table S3: Relative nursing to medical staff FTEs 
Specialty 
Ratio of nursing & midwife staff 
FTEs to medical staff FTEs 
Maternity 4 
Paediatric 2 
Surgery 2 
Acute Medical 4 
 
The resource requirement for blood was obtained by combining NHS Blood and 
Transplant (NHSBT) data with published data (Forster et al., 2003) outlining red 
blood cell unit usage by different specialties. Table S4 summarises the blood resource 
requirement. For simplicity, we have chosen to use the usage of red blood cell 
products as a proxy for all blood use. 
 
Table S4: Blood resource requirement 
Specialty Units of blood per case 
Surgery 0.2 
Maternity 0.05 
Paediatric 0.12 
Acute medical 0.12 
DEMAND 
Table S5 summarises approximate relative demand for the different services, 
expressed as a percentage of the overall demand for all services, based on nationwide 
annual HES figures for FCEs. Also listed is the percentage of that demand that is 
attributed to emergency care (again, based on nationwide annual HES figures). 
 
It is assumed that these relative proportions are constant at all locations and that the 
number and relative size of hospitals within the local health system are as in Table S6. 
 
Table S5: Breakdown of admissions by specialty 
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Service 
% of total 
demand 
% of which is attributable 
to emergency care 
Acute 48 49 
Maternity 15 65 
Paediatrics 10 28 
Surgery 27 37 
 
Table S6: Hospitals within the putative local health system 
Hospital Category Small Medium Large 
Relative size (total 
admissions) 
1 1.5 2 
Number of hospitals 
modelled 
3 5 2 
 
These assumptions allow us to further break down the headline FCE figures on a per-
hospital and per-service basis. These disaggregated demand figures were used as the 
demand input for the model runs. 
RESOURCE AVAILABILITY 
In order to populate the pre-disruption resource availability at each hospital in the 
illustrative example, we assumed that it was equal to the pre-disruption demand for 
resources (calculated from the resource requirements per case and the case demand 
inputs described above), with 5% excess capacity. 
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